Laws Against Pornography and Porno Action

RUU APP is not a new discourse in this country regulatory legislation. He is also not a new draft law prepared. This bill has been prepared more than 3 years ago, by the government. However gaungnya not as loud now. Even until the mid-year 2005, this bill can be said to disappear from circulation, in the sense of not getting publicity means.
This bill rediscover its popularity when the preparation of the National Legislation Program Period 2004-2009 Parliament. PBB, PKS, and PPP urged that this bill be a priority. Finally in June 2005, this bill into Parliament Initiative proposal with 30 signatures proposer (from a minimum of 13 signatures).
Why is this bill in trouble (which I call the result of broad political constellation)

It's not a difficult matter to find some substantial weaknesses of this bill. Here I will give several reasons:
1. God spoke on-call
As a state law, all legal products are appropriately generated and rooted in the ideology of the State, in this case the Pancasila.
However, this bill clearly reveals that the role of God (with all its interpretation) put forward as the source of a state law.
Here are excerpts of General Explanation of the Bill APP: "Indonesia is a country that adheres to the Pancasila ideology ...-cutted-life ideology berketuhanan As a follower of the Indonesian people believe that God has forbidden the attitude and actions of a-social, a-moral, and a-moral in life sex, such as abuse, infidelity, violence, sex, sexual deviation, and dissemination gagasangagasan about sex, because it can damage the fabric of community life-cutted-Such actions are also considered to demonstrate against the power of God. "
The question that arises is, why should carry the name of God? Although humans against the power of God, that's not right and obligation to take care of the state. State relating to public space, God is a private space.

2. Self-Degrading Culture of the Nation
This bill made the argument to protect the fabric of society. But in fact, he even considers culture itself as the nation's porn. Kemben, koteka, the tradition of bathing in the river, the reliefs in the temples it is considered pornographic by this bill.

3. Subjective Acting Opportunities
Article 25: "... prohibited from displaying certain sensual body parts." Explanation of Article 4: "... is a certain sensual body parts such as genitals, thighs, hips, buttocks, navel and breasts of women, whether visible or in part entirely. "
Use of the word 'among others' in the explanation of Article 4 indicates that is allowed to add other body parts into the category of sensual. This in no way be justified. Law will be pushed around by the authorities.

4. Discriminatory
Examples for this can be seen in defining "certain sensual body parts" as the explanation of Article 4 above. When calling 'genitals, thighs, hips, buttocks, navel' This bill does not pay attention to gender differences. However, when calling the breast, which is referred to female breasts. Gender discrimination occurs in this article.
Article 28 UUD 1945 declared a legal product can not be discriminatory. Therefore, viewed from the perspective of the Constitution, this bill is not worthy of promulgation.

5. Mind-based law ngeres
Several chapters in this bill shows that the compiler actually have a mind that ngeres, or legalize ngeres mind as a legal basis. One example is the explanation of Article 28.
Article 28 paragraph (1) reads: "Every person is prohibited erotic dancing or swaying erotically in public." Explanation of Article 28 reads: "... while those who are doing is shaking erotic body movements are rhythmic, not following the principles of dance , and further highlight the sexual nature such that these movements can be predicted aims to stimulate lust. "Again, who can be 'suspect' movement aims to stimulate lust? Of course they ngeres minded.
Today in Parliament (committee) only the PDI-P faction which explicitly stating his refusal. Another fraction stating there is absolutely supports (F-MCC), or have not stated attitude. Looking at the political position of the existing parties, not one of pessimism seems to show, at least for the process in parliament.
But pessimism is not going to change anything. The only thing that can change the state is raising public opinion and resistance. If we can not change the attitude of the pro draft, at least we should force them to think again, again and again. Think of the impact and the resistance is going to happen. Bali is a good example for this.
Demonstrations conducted by various elements of society, either pro or contra, also shows how this bill relate to all parties. Even the MUI had to form the Guard Desk RUU APP. Something strange here, if it wants to develop the laws governing pornography products, why not be open to criticism given. If the constructive criticism was rejected, even to make the threats, natural and not wrong, if then people wonder, "Is there anything hidden?"
Are there hidden?
The question "Is there anything hidden?" Is certainly worthy of us to ask. One of them, and which in my opinion the most important are concerns about the entry of religious law, in this case Islam. Actually, not just Islam, even the Church of Law, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian one, if entered into the state system and to regulate and enforce dress code of morality, of course, should we tolak.Kecenderungan mass action that happened also suggests this fact. Party Pro RUU APP, almost certainly comes from a known radical Islamic organizations or the struggle to enforce Islamic laws, such as FPI, MMI, HTI, etc.. Counter-parties with no intention to exaggerate infinitely more complex and consists of various groups / kelompok..Ini not about hating a religion or group. It is about the diversity that this country became the joint. If the diversity of Indonesia rejected outright, and a monoculture is enforced, who is convinced that this country would be better?

The Arab Experience

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, international pressure mounted for political reform in the Middle East, particularly the Arab world. For its part, the Bush administration elevated democracy promotion in the Middle East to a key strategic priority. The administration’s policy sprung from the belief that strong linkages exist between the Middle East’s long history of autocratic rule and the emergence of a transnational terrorist movement with its roots in many of those same countries. Numerous independent analyses likewise have suggested that the Middle East’s dysfunctional, autocratic political systems are helping to breed Islamist extremism.

An Islamist “Tsunami”

Yet, despite the critical importance assigned to political opening in the Middle East, a number of factors, including ongoing turmoil in Iraq and competing priorities of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), have intervened to complicate U.S. democracy promotion efforts. In particular, various Islamist parties’ strong showings in recent elections have added a new layer of complexity to U.S. democracy promotion efforts in the Arab world. Indeed, across the region, Islamist parties and organizations boast strong grassroots support. These groups represent a broad spectrum of views, ranging from moderate parties that have renounced violence to well-established terrorist organizations.

Hamas’ resounding victory in the January 25, 2006 Palestinian elections, winning 74 out of 132 seats, is perhaps the most dramatic example of the power Islamists wield at the ballot box. Deemed a terrorist organization by the United States and Europe, the party’s rise to power has significantly complicated U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority as well as efforts to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similar concerns characterize Hizballah’s role in Lebanon. The terrorist organization won 14 of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament in the June 2005 elections, the first independent vote in thirty years following the withdrawal of Syrian troops. While Hizballah’s parliamentary presence is far outstripped by an anti-Syrian opposition bloc, the organization still holds significant sway over Lebanese politics and is the only political party to maintain an armed militia.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won 88 of 454 seats during the 2005 parliamentary elections, winning 61 percent of the seats it contested. The MB now holds the largest opposition bloc in parliament, with 20 percent of the seats. (Secular opposition parties won only 3.5 percent of the seats, while independents fared only slightly better with 6.5 percent.) Similarly, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF), a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, has the largest presence of any political party in the Jordanian parliament, with 17 out of 110 seats. The IAF is anticipated to gain even more power via this year’s municipal elections and in the 2007 parliamentary elections.

In North Africa, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) stands as the most powerful grassroots opposition force in Morocco. It currently holds 42 of 325 seats in parliament, the third largest bloc. Assuming the PJD is allowed to compete freely in the upcoming 2007 parliamentary elections, the party is expected to win even more seats, if not an outright majority.2

Finally, in the Gulf, Islamist parties have also made important inroads in parliamentary politics. In Iraq, Islamist parties hold a majority (by some estimates, 65 percent) of seats following the December elections, while Islamist parties and organizations maintain appreciable influence in the Kuwaiti, Bahraini, and Yemeni parliaments.

Not surprisingly, therefore, U. S. policy makers are increasingly forced to address the key question of whether to engage Islamist parties and what role they envision for these parties in America’s democracy promotion strategy. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a successful policy of democracy promotion in the Arab world that does not address specifically the role of Islamist parties. To date, however, U.S. policy largely has steered clear of addressing directly the role of Islamist parties. The Islamist “tsunami” has even led some to question whether the U.S. should engage in any sort of democracy promotion in the region.

Engaging Islamists

Once a taboo topic, relegated to closed door meetings and “eyes only” policy memos, the role of Islamist parties is now openly debated in foreign policy circles, where some believe the integration of moderate Islamists holds the key to successful democratic opening. A task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations addressed the issue as part of a longer report on Arab democracy. The Task Force recommended that Washington support the political participation of moderate Islamists who are “committed to abide by the rules and norms of the democratic process.”

Before debating the merits and drawbacks of engaging Islamists in the Arab world, it is useful to consider an earlier case: the aborted Algerian elections of December 1991. At that time, Algeria’s political opening was unparalleled in the Arab world. A legal Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) stood on the verge of gaining a commanding majority of the national parliament through free and fair elections. Instead, the army intervened, canceling the elections and banning the FIS. Moderates in the movement were discredited and quickly eclipsed by radicals who took up arms in a brutal insurgency that was to last more than a decade and cost more than 100,000 lives. No one knows what would have happened if the election results had been upheld, but in many ways the tensions in Algeria’s drama at that time encapsulate the very questions we are considering today.

In the most simplified terms, these tensions reduce to the question of whether Islamists who renounce violence and profess a willingness to play by the rules are genuine or whether allowing them to compete freely in the political arena will empower illiberal, antidemocratic forces. Does the adage, “One man, one vote, one time”—a phrase first made popular at the outset of the Algerian elections—apply?

Moderate Islamists throughout the region increasingly say the right things with respect to the need for democratic reforms and what those reforms should look like. For example, among its many demands, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s March 2004 Platform for Reform calls for universal suffrage, presidential term limits, and the right for both women and men to serve in parliament. The Brotherhood also calls for the restoration of basic freedoms and underscores its future vision of Egypt as a “democratic and constitutional parliamentary republic within the realm of Islamic principles.” It also has demanded the abolition of Egypt’s repressive Emergency Laws, the lifting of restrictions on political parties and associations, the strengthening of parliament and the creation of an independent judiciary.

Nonetheless, key questions arise as to whether the Muslim Brotherhood is genuine in its professed commitment to democratic ideals. Can they be trusted, or are these pronouncements merely tactical appeasements designed to pave their path to power? Are the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamist parties like it, capable of a genuine evolution in their thinking? Ultimately, an assessment of whether such parties can evolve into democratic entities, and if so, whether their evolution can be facilitated by others, will be central to the broader question of what role moderate Islamist parties can play in democratic politics.

When trying to assess the potential for evolution within Islamist parties, it is essential to bear in mind that Islamist parties, like other political actors, are not static entities, but dynamic forces capable of change. Some Western analyses of these groups assume that Islamist groups are rigid, averse to pragmatism, and unwilling to moderate their positions on questions such as the imposition of shari’a law. However two key characteristics of Islamist parties must be considered. First, Islamist parties are not monolithic, but diverse and heterogeneous, covering a broad spectrum from moderate to violent. These groups’ positions on the application of shari’a, both in terms of the scope and timing of its role in defining societal norms, vary significantly. Second, these parties appear capable of change from within. They are first and foremost, political actors. Numerous examples attest to the ability of these groups to change and adapt to their circumstances. Indeed, their potential for evolution has been compared by some to that of the European Christian Democrats.

Factors for Success

Certainly, there are no guarantees in politics, and it is difficult to make a definitive judgment on the role of Islamist parties during political openings. Nonetheless, the presence of four key factors can help to assuage concerns that Islamist parties will exploit political openings to overturn nascent democracies.

• Institution-building. A well-established system of checks and balances undergirded by strong, transparent institutions that are accountable to the public and founded on the rule of law stands as the most important guarantee against Islamist forces coming to power and implementing antidemocratic rule. In this regard, one of the key lessons learned from the Algerian experience is that elections should be among the final steps of political opening, not the first. Building strong institutions fortified by constitutional amendments that distribute power equitably and insure checks on executive power will be crucial to any effort at political reform.

• Establishing clear “red lines.” Vali Nasr, from the Naval Postgraduate School, who addressed this conference last year, has underscored the importance of clearly established “red lines” that serve as democratic restraints (on both Islamists as well as ruling regimes) on how far various political actors can push their agendas.3 In this context, “red lines” should not be confused with the implementation of measures that are inherently anti-democratic, but rather clearly defined restraints on power applied equally to regimes and opposition movements. Nasr emphasized that reversals in reform have taken place in countries where no clear “red lines” have been established. Such “red lines” can be explicit, laid down in constitutions or national pacts, or they can be implicit. In an example of the latter, Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD) opted to limit voluntarily the number of seats it contested in the 2003 elections. Its actions suggest the party’s respect for an implicit “red line” drawn by the monarchy in the wake of the May 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca.

• Formation of secular-Islamist reform alliances. Alliance building between secular and Islamist opposition groups has begun to take root in some Arab countries, including Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt. In Yemen, for example, the “Joint Meeting of Opposition Parties” functions as an important forum for ongoing collaboration between the Islamist Islah Party and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), an ardently secular party. Cooperation and dialogue between these two parties has yielded important gains in process-related areas, such as improving electoral laws. More broadly, two key non-government Arab reform initiatives, the March 2004 Beirut Summit and the June 2004 Doha Declaration, featured close cooperation by Islamist and secular reform advocates. While it is still too early to determine the impact of these alliances, coalition-building necessarily requires real compromise which could in turn lead to a genuine evolution in thinking. At a minimum, secular and opposition groups joining forces to pressure for greater political opening may accelerate the momentum for change and provide an effective counter-weight to ruling regimes.

• Opening political space to allow for genuine multi-party competition. An open political arena, characterized by fierce competition for votes among parties, will further contribute to greater pragmatism on the part of moderate Islamist parties as they seek to win votes, gain influence, and garner popular appeal. The imperatives of political participation amidst real competition from viable secular parties with genuine popular appeal can be an important force for moderation among Islamist parties. Of course, it is essential that independent, secular parties be strengthened as an effective counterbalance.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Finally, it is important to consider a number of key implications for U.S. policy:

• Engage directly with moderate Islamists.

Given the Islamists’ strong popular appeal, the U.S. can no longer afford to call for democratic change in the region while ignoring one of its most potent political forces. Indeed, to be sustained and successful, reform efforts in the region must be inclusive, reaching out to all elements of society willing to “play by the rules.” The national political party institutes (the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI)) have worked consistently and quietly, behind the scenes to engage moderate Islamists across the Arab world. Their efforts have laid important groundwork by cementing relationships with key Islamist parties. The U.S. must continue and deepen its efforts to reach out to moderate Islamist politicians and activists, both in the region as well as on exchanges to the United States. In particular, exchanges should target both Islamist politicians, as well as representatives from the religious establishments of various Arab countries.

• Enhanced political party training for both secular and moderate Islamist parties.

While NDI and IRI already have political party strengthening programs in place, intensified efforts must be made to train and bolster secular opposition parties as an effective counterbalance to powerful Islamist opposition parties. To date, secular opposition parties have had little success in attracting substantial grassroots support. These parties often are riven by internal divisions, and suffer from the same aging leadership, stagnation and lack of transparency that characterize ruling governments in the region. At the same time, moderate Islamist parties should not be excluded from such training opportunities. As mentioned above, it is critical that these actors be included in reform efforts and vested with a stake in democratic reform.

• Support Islamist-secularist dialogues on reform. In addition to accelerating and deepening political party training, greater funding should be allocated to support dialogue and other means of “bridging” reformers from Islamist and secular spheres. Fostering alliances for reform that bring secular and Islamist reformers together stands as a logical follow-on to working separately with Islamist and secular opposition parties. As well, moderate Islamists should also be included in multilateral for a such as the Democracy Assistance Dialogue which is part of the G-8’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative.

• Greater emphasis on projects and programs that strengthen institutions and support

the rule of law. The push for free elections must be accompanied by commensurate support for institution building, particularly programs that aim to establish independent judiciaries, strengthen parliaments, and promote the rule of the law. Alongside institution building, it is essential for the United States to pressure Arab governments that maintain Emergency Laws (e.g., Egypt, Algeria, Syria) to lift these restrictions. Such restrictions, at times in place for decades, substantially undercut the rule of law and allow ruling regimes to operate with impunity. The lifting of Emergency Laws is particularly important in countries that are planning to hold elections, in order to insure sufficient freedoms to competing political parties, the press, and key elements of civil society.

• De-conflict contradictions between democracy promotion policies and the Global War on Terror. U.S. policy toward political Islam is often caught between the conflicting demands of democracy promotion and the global war on terror. Regional regimes are often sent mixed messages. Security and intelligence cooperation from Arab governments is encouraged as part of the GWOT. Yet, crackdowns on suspected terrorists often result in human rights violations and an increase in repression. U.S. strategy must balance the needs of nurturing civil society and greater political opening while guarding against extremism.

To conclude, engaging moderate Islamists and supporting their inclusion in the political arena is critical to the region’s long-term stability. Islamist parties willing to “play by the rules,” renounce violence and assert support for democratic principles should be allowed to participate in politics. They must be given a stake and feel vested in the system. Such participation, in concert with strong institutions, clearly-identified “red lines,” healthy political competition and incentives for alliance building, could well be the beginning of a virtuous circle, where participation breeds greater moderation. The alternative— repression of moderate Islamist forces or their isolation—could well provoke the opposite, a vicious cycle of radicalization and violence.

Bhineka Tunggal Ika

Indonesia has the ideology of Pancasila. The motto of Pancasila are associated with differences, namely Bhineka Tunggal Ika, which means it is 'Diversity remains one nevertheless'. This deals with diversity in ethnicity, religion, race, culture, which exists in Indonesia, but this should not become an issue, even becoming a unifying this nation, to the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia.

Surely this should be the basis for us together to not question the difference, but makes a difference menjdai wealth that can be unifying.

History of religious pluralism

For purposes of exposition, views about religious pluralism may be loosely classified into views about 1) inter-religious pluralism and 2) intra-religious pluralism. By inter-religious pluralism, we mean the views held within one major faith tradition (e.g., Christianity) about the validity or truth of other major faith traditions (e.g., Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, etc.). In contrast, intra-religious pluralism refers to views held by specific schools or denominations within a major faith tradition (e.g., by Eastern Orthodox Christians) about the validity or truth of other schools or denominations within the same major faith tradition (e.g., about Protestant Christianity or Roman Catholic Christianity).
The following subsections examine inter-religious pluralism within several major faith traditions.

Bahá'í views

Bahá'u'lláh, founder of Bahá'í Faith, urged the elimination of religious intolerance. He taught that God is one, and has manifested himself to humanity through several historic messengers. Bahá'u'lláh taught that Bahá'ís must associate with peoples of all religions, showing the love of God in relations with them, whether this is reciprocated or not.
Bahá'í's refer to the concept of Progressive revelation, which means that God's will is revealed to mankind progressively as mankind matures and is better able to comprehend the purpose of God in creating humanity. In this view, God's word is revealed through a series of messengers: Abraham, Krishna, Moses, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, and Bahá'u'lláh (the founder of the Bahá'í Faith) among them. In the Kitáb-i-Íqán (Book of Certitude), Bahá'u'lláh explains that messengers of God have a twofold station, one of divinity and one of an individual. According to Bahá'í writings, there will not be another messenger for many hundreds of years. There is also a respect for the religious traditions of the native peoples of the planet who may have little other than oral traditions as a record of their religious figures.

Buddhist views

In the Brahmajala Sutta,[3] the Buddha is recorded as stating that the teachings of other sects of his day were based on one or more of 62 erroneous theories, and that falling into those errors would prevent attaining permanent liberation from suffering:
Bhikkus, there are countless philosophies, doctrines, and theories in this world. People criticize each other and argue endlessly over their theories. According to my investigation, there are sixty-two main theories which underlie the thousands of philosophies and religions current in our world. Looked at from the Way of Enlightenment and Emancipation, all sixty-two of these theories contain errors and create obstacles… A good fisherman places his net in the water and catches all the shrimp and fish he can. As he watches the creatures try to leap out of the net, he tells them, ‘No matter how high you jump, you will only land in the net again.’ He is correct. The thousands of beliefs flourishing at present can all be found in the net of these sixty-two theories. Bhikkus, don’t fall into that bewitching net. You will only waste time and lose your chance to practice the Way of Enlightenment.[4]
The earliest reference to Buddhist views on religious pluralism in a political sense is found in the Edicts of Emperor Ashoka:
"All religions should reside everywhere, for all of them desire self-control and purity of heart." Rock Edict Nb7 (S. Dhammika)
"Contact (between religions) is good. One should listen to and respect the doctrines professed by others. Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, desires that all should be well-learned in the good doctrines of other religions." Rock Edict Nb12 (S. Dhammika)
When asked, “Don’t all religions teach the same thing? Is it possible to unify them?” the Dalai Lama said:
People from different traditions should keep their own, rather than change. However, some Tibetan may prefer Islam, so he can follow it. Some Spanish prefer Buddhism; so follow it. But think about it carefully. Don’t do it for fashion. Some people start Christian, follow Islam, then Buddhism, then nothing. In the United States I have seen people who embrace Buddhism and change their clothes! Like the New Age. They take something Hindu, something Buddhist, something, something… That is not healthy. For individual practitioners, having one truth, one religion, is very important. Several truths, several religions, is contradictory. I am Buddhist. Therefore, Buddhism is the only truth for me, the only religion. To my Christian friend, Christianity is the only truth, the only religion. To my Muslim friend, [Islam] is the only truth, the only religion. In the meantime, I respect and admire my Christian friend and my Muslim friend. If by unifying you mean mixing, that is impossible, useless.

Classical Greek and Roman pagan views

The ancient Greeks were polytheists; pluralism in that historical era meant accepting the existence of and validity of other peoples religions. Ancient Greeks employed Interpretatio Graeca whereby the gods of other religions were equated with those of their own pantheon. The Romans easily accomplished this task by subsuming the entire set of gods from other faiths into their own religion; this was done on rare occasion by adding a new god to their own pantheon; on most occasions they identified another religion's gods with their own, see syncretism which can be a form of Inclusivism.

Christian views

Some Christians have argued that religious pluralism is an invalid or self-contradictory concept. Maximal forms of religious pluralism claim that all religions are equally true, or that one religion can be true for some and another for others. Some Christians hold this idea to be logically impossible from the Principle of contradiction
Other Christians have held that there can be truth value and salvific value in other faith traditions. John Macquarrie, described in the Handbook of Anglican Theologians (1998) as "unquestionably Anglicanism's most distinguished systematic theologian in the second half of the twentieth century," wrote that "there should be an end to proselytizing but that equally there should be no syncretism of the kind typified by the Baha'i movement" (p. 2). In discussing 9 founders of major faith traditions (Moses, Zoroaster, Lao-zu, Buddha, Confucius, Socrates, Krishna, Jesus, and Muhammad), which he called "mediators between the human and the divine," Macquarrie wrote that:
I do not deny for a moment that the truth of God has reached others through other channels - indeed, I hope and pray that it has. So while I have a special attachment to one mediator, I have respect for them all. (p. 12])

Hindu views

The Hindu religion is naturally pluralistic. A well-known Rig Vedic hymn says that "Truth is One, though the sages know it variously." (Ékam sat vipra bahudā vadanti)[9]. Similarly, in the Bhagavad Gītā (4:11), God, manifesting as an incarnation, states that "As people approach me, so I receive them. All paths lead to me" (ye yathā māṃ prapadyante tāṃs tathāiva bhajāmyaham mama vartmānuvartante manuṣyāḥ pārtha sarvaśaḥ) The Hindu religion has no theological difficulties in accepting degrees of truth in other religions. Hinduism emphasizes that everyone actually worship the same God, whether they know it or not. Just as Hindus worshiping Ganesh is seen as valid by those worshiping Vishnu, so someone worshiping Jesus or Allah is accepted. Many foreign deities become assimilated into Hinduism, and some Hindus may sometimes offer prayers to Jesus along with their traditional forms of God. For this reason, Hinduism usually has good relations with other religious groups accepting pluralism. In particular, Hinduism and Buddhism coexist peacefully in many parts of the world.

Islamic views

Muslims consider the monotheistic faiths that preceded it, Judaism and Christianity, to be valid in its original form Yet they believe that these religions were corrupted and are consequently invalid today. Muslims also believe that the Qu'ran confirms the scriptures that came before including the Torah and the Gospel.

Jain views

Anekāntavāda, the principle of relative pluralism, is one of the basic principles of Jainism. In this view, the truth or the reality is perceived differently from different points of view, and no single point of view is the complete truth. Jain doctrine states that an object has infinite modes of existence and qualities and they cannot be completely perceived in all its aspects and manifestations, due to inherent limitations of the humans. Only the Kevalins - the omniscient beings - can comprehend the object in all its aspects and manifestations, and all others are capable of knowing only a part of it Consequently, no one view can claim to represent the absolute truth. Jains compare all attempts to proclaim absolute truth with adhgajanyāyah or the "maxim of the blind men and elephant", wherein all the blind men claimed to explain the true appearance of the elephant, but could only partly succeed due to their narrow perspective.

Jewish views

Sikh views

The Sikh Gurus (religious leaders) have propagated the message of "many paths" leading to the one God and ultimate salvation for all souls who treading on the path of righteousness. They have supported the view that proponents of all faiths can, by doing good and virtuous deeds and by remembering the Lord can certainly achieve salvation. Students of the Sikh faith are told to accept all leading faiths as possible vehicles for attaining spiritual enlightenment, provided the faithful study, ponder and practice the teachings of their prophets and leaders. The holy book of the Sikhs (the Sri Guru Granth Sahib) says, "Do not say that the Vedas, the Bible and the Koran are false. Those who do not contemplate them are false." Guru Granth Sahib page 1350. and "The seconds,minutes,and hours,days,weeks and months and various seasons originate from One Sun; O nanak,in just the same way, the many forms originate from the Creator." Guru Granth Sahib page 12,13
The Guru Granth Sahib also says that Bhagat Namdev and Bhagat Kabir, who were both believed to be Hindus, both attained salvation though they were born before Sikhism took root and were clearly not Sikhs. This highlights and reinforces the Guru's saying that "peoples of other faiths" can join with God as true and also at the same time signify that Sikhism is not the exclusive path for liberation. Again, the Guru Granth Sahib provides this verse: "Naam Dayv the printer, and Kabeer the weaver, obtained salvation through the Perfect Guru. Those who know God and recognize His Shabad ("word") lose their ego and class consciousness." Guru Granth Sahib page 67  Most of the 15 Sikh Bhagats who are mentioned in their holy book were non-Sikhs and belonged to Hindu and Muslim faiths, which were the most prevalent religions of this region.
Sikhs have always being eager exponents of interfaith dialogue and will not only accept the right of other to practise their faith but have in the past fought and laid down their lives to protect this right for others. See the sacrifice of the ninth Sikh Guru, Guru Tegh Bahadar who on the final desperate and heart-rending pleas of the Kashmiri Pandit, agreed to put up a fight for their right to practise their religion. In this regard, Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth Sikh Guru writes in the Dasam Granth :
He protected the forehead mark and sacred thread (of the Hindus) which marked a great event in the Iron age.
For the sake of saints, he laid down his head without even a sign.13.
For the sake of Dharma, he sacrificed himself. He laid down his head but not his creed.
The saints of the Lord abhor the performance of miracles and malpractices. 14.
Dasam Granth, Bachitar Nanak, Page 131
The Sikhs have promoted their faith as an Interfaith religion and have taken a lead in uniting all the different religions of the world. The message of unity of the faiths is summed up in this quotation from the Guru Granth Sahib: "One who recognizes that all spiritual paths lead to the One shall be emancipated. One who speaks lies shall fall into hell and burn. In all the world, the most blessed and sanctified are those who remain absorbed in Truth." (Guru Granth Sahib page 142), Guru Granth Sahib page 142

Intra-religious pluralism

As noted earlier, intra-religious pluralism refers to views held by specific schools or denominations within a major faith tradition (e.g., by Eastern Orthodox Christians) about the validity or truth of other schools or denominations within the same major faith tradition (e.g., about Protestant Christianity or Roman Catholic Christianity). The following subsections describe views about intra-religious pluralism by various denominations and religious thinkers within several major faith traditions.

Christian views

Classical Christian views

Before the Great Schism, mainstream Christianity confessed "one holy catholic and apostolic church", in the words of the Nicene Creed. Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Episcopalians and most Protestant Christian denominations still maintain this belief.
Church unity was something very visible and tangible, and schism was just as serious an offense as heresy. Following the Great Schism, Roman Catholicism sees and recognizes the Orthodox Sacraments as valid. Eastern Orthodoxy does not have the concept of "validity" when applied to Sacraments, but it considers the form of Roman Catholic Sacraments to be acceptable, if still devoid of actual spiritual content. Both generally regard each other as "heterodox" and "schismatic", while continuing to recognize each other as Christian.[citation needed] Attitudes of both towards different Protestant groups vary, primarily based upon how strongly Trinitarian the Protestant group in question might be.[citation needed]
Many Christians hold that the Christian church is not just an institution, which can be broken into many denominations. They hold that each instituted church is able to worship God in a way that conforms to Scripture, which allows for many different styles and customs. They hold that all true Christians are united in belief in Jesus Christ, which can be judged against such documents as the Apostles' Creed.[citation needed]

Modern Christian views

Many Protestant Christian groups hold that only believers which believe in certain fundamental doctrines know the true pathway to salvation. The core of this doctrine is that Jesus Christ was a perfect man, is the Son of God and that he died and rose again for the wrongdoing of those who will accept the gift of salvation. They continue to believe in "one" church, believing in fundamental issues there is unity and non-fundamental issues there is liberty. Some Protestants are doubtful if the Roman Catholicism or Eastern Orthodoxy are still valid manifestations of the Church and usually reject movements begun within 19th century Christianity, such as Mormonism, Christian Science, or Jehovah's Witnesses as not distinctly Christian.
Modern Christian ideas on intra-religious pluralism (between different denominations of Christianity) are discussed in the article on Ecumenism.

Islamic views

Classical views

Like Christianity, Islam originally did not have ideas of religious pluralism for different Islamic denominations. Early on, Islam developed into several mutually antagonistic streams, including Shiite Islam and Sunni Islam. In some periods believers in these two communities went to war with each other over religious differences.

Modern (post-Enlightenment) Islamic views

Some Shiite, Suni and Sufi Islamic leaders are willing to recognize each other's denomination as a valid form of Islam.[citation needed] However, many other Islamic leaders are unwilling to accept this; they view other forms of Islam as outside the Islamic religion.[

Cultural Pluralism

Cultural pluralism is a term used when smaller groups within a larger society maintain their unique cultural identities, and whose values and practices are accepted by the wider culture.
One example is Lebanon where 18 different religious communities co-exist on a land of 10,452 km². In a pluralist culture, unique groups not only co-exist side by side, but also consider qualities of other groups as traits worth having in the dominant culture.
The current contemporary art world in the 21st century is an example of cultural pluralism. For another example, a community center in the United States may offer classes in Indian yoga, Chinese calligraphy, and Latin salsa dancing. That community may also have one or more synagogues, mosques, mandirs, gurudwaras, and/or Buddhist temples, as well as several churches of various Christian denominations.
The existence of such institutions and practices are possible if the cultural communities responsible for them are protected by law and/or accepted by the larger society in a pluralist culture.
The idea of cultural pluralism in America has its roots in the transcendentalist movement and was developed by pragmatist philosophers such as William James and John Dewey, and later thinkers such as Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne. One of the most famous articulations of cultural pluralistic ideas can be found in Bourne's 1916 essay "Trans-National America"